This guidance sets out the CPS policy on the prosecution of immigration offences. The guidance covers a wide range of offending including illegal entry into the United Kingdom (UK), facilitation of illegal arrival and entry, use and possession of false documentation and employment offences linked to illegal entrants.
Prosecutors should note that even if criminal proceedings cannot be brought, a person may remain administratively categorised as an illegal entrant and still be subject to deportation or removed by the Home Office under section 3(5) or 4(2) Immigration Act 1971. This guidance also contains information on diversion by way of a Foreign National Offender Conditional Caution (FNOCC).
Individuals and organised groups may commit a variety of offences when gaining or facilitating illegal entry into the UK. Some of the commonly prosecuted immigration offences are:
For more information on these and other commonly prosecuted offences, see Annex 1: Table of Immigration Offences below.
Section 24 of the 1971 Act contained provisions for illegal entry offences that were summary only. Most of these offences remain on the statute book, but section 24 has been amended by the Nationality and Borders Act (NABA) 2022 to make provision for new offences. Alongside the existing offences, NABA has introduced two new offences that can be committed by simple arrival rather than entry, the latter having a technical legal definition set out in section 11 of the 1971 Act. It also increases the maximum sentence for these offences so that they are now triable in the Crown Court as well as the magistrates’ court. As these offences are now indictable, the Criminal Attempts Act 1981 applies, and it is therefore an offence to attempt to commit a section 24 offence.
Prosecutors should be mindful of the transitional provisions that are in place for the illegal entry offences prior to commencement of NABA. Thus, for any illegal entry offences committed before 28 June 2022, prosecutors should continue to charge cases under the provisions of the 1971 Act as they were before.
Prosecutors should note the consent and jurisdiction issue in relation to certain offences which fall within the jurisdiction of the Admiralty (see below, under 'Consent to prosecution for Admiralty Offences'). For more information on these offences, see Annex 1.
NABA introduced two new offences into section 24. These are:
A person who is a non-British/Irish national or who does not have a right of abode, will normally require entry clearance (visa) prior to arriving in the UK. The provision now makes it an immigration offence knowingly to arrive in the UK where entry clearance is required under immigration rules. The evidence will need to address that no valid entry clearance was issued by the Secretary of State. It is for the defence to prove that the person had valid entry clearance.
The following can form the basis this:
(1) The Secretary of State may by order make further provision with respect to the giving, refusing or varying of leave to enter the United Kingdom.
(3) The Secretary of State may by order provide that, in such circumstances as may be prescribed—
(a) an entry visa, or
(b) such other form of entry clearance as may be prescribed…”
An ETA is a pre-departure check for a non-British/Irish person who does not require a visa when travelling to the UK. The provision now makes it an immigration offence not to have a valid ETA where one is required. The offence is committed when:
This provision will commence on a date after the new Immigration Rules come into force. It is also now an offence to obtain an ETA by deception under section 24A(1)(ii) which is also triable either way.
Section 25 prohibits facilitation of a breach of immigration law. The breach need not constitute an offence. In Javaherifard and Miller [2005] EWCA Crim 3231 the court held “… it would be absurd if unlawful presence did not constitute a breach of immigration law. Section 1(2) of the 1971 Act sets out the general principles for those who have no right of abode. They “may live in the United Kingdom by permission and subject to such regulation and control of their entry into, stay in and departure from the United Kingdom as is imposed by this Act …”. That carries with it the necessary implication that they may only live in the UK with permission and that without that they are in breach of immigration control in living here. Section 3 which contains the provisions for general immigration control, prohibits non-British/Irish citizens to enter without leave.
When referring cases to the CPS, Immigration Enforcement (IE) should identify the law that it is said to have been breached, which must be an immigration law within the meaning of section 25(2) Immigration Act 1971.
Depending on the facts of the case, except in cases of unlawful arrival, section 1(2) and/or section 3(1)(b) Immigration 1971 Act can be relied on separately or in combination to specify the breach of unlawful entry or remaining. Taken together these provisions ‘determine’ whether a person is entering or in the UK lawfully, and comprise “immigration law”: see R v Kapoor and others [2012] EWCA Crim 435 and R v Dhall (Harpreet Singh) [2013] EWCA Crim 1610. The provisions provide as follows:
In almost all such cases, the breach of underlying law for the purposes of section 25 can and should be particularised by reference to both sections 1 and 3, including where illegal arrival (under section 24(D1)) has been facilitated. This was confirmed in Mohamed & Ors [2023] EWCA Crim 211 where the Court held that the conduct facilitated need not be criminal at all; it need only be a breach of immigration law. The conduct said to have been facilitated in the indictment against Mohamed and others could have been expressed as breaches of the Immigration Rules under the regime established by section 3A of the 1971 Act.
This means that where the person being facilitated is below the age of 10, and therefore criminal responsibility, section 25 applies whether or not the underlying breach is a criminal offence.
Mohamed & Ors also confirmed that the fact that a passenger is (or may be) a refugee is not relevant to the question of whether someone is guilty of the section 25 offence and would not provide a defence. Providing an indented breach of immigration law.
In Bina [2014] EWCA Crim 1444 it was held that section 25(1) Immigration Act 1971 is applicable as much to those who assist asylum seekers as to other individuals. The Court of Appeal held that it was plain that there was no limitation of section 25 to non-asylum seekers and that, unfortunately, even persons who in the end are found to have genuine asylum claims have sometimes committed breaches of immigration law on securing entry to the UK. The court held that the statute is aimed at those who facilitate such unlawful entry.
Proving the intention to commit an act which amounts to a breach of immigration law is an essential element of the section 25 offence. In the context of offences involving vehicles and boats, this means proving a breach of the general principles in section 1 and 3 above which regulate entry into and stay in the UK, by seeking to facilitate arrival or entry into, or leave to remain in, the UK unlawfully.
Where a concealed method of entry is used, either by vehicle or boat, there should be no difficulty in proving an intention to breach immigration law, as in those cases the intention is to evade immigration controls altogether in order to secure entry into the country. However, where boats which are not carrying migrant passengers covertly are intercepted at sea, the position may be more complex.
It is important that there is early engagement with the CPS from the outset of the investigation to develop a prosecution strategy and provide early advice (EA) where appropriate. This will include advising on who should be treated as a suspect, victim or witness and the public interest in prosecuting or continuing a prosecution where Immigration Enforcement consider that administrative removal is appropriate. Early engagement is crucial where international enquiries and early financial investigation is required.
People smuggling offences are “lifestyle offences” for the purposes of proceeds of crime. It is therefore important that financial investigation is carried out in parallel. Consideration should be given to a parallel financial investigation in relation to the other offences, particularly where there is an early suspicion of financial gain.
Prosecutors should be aware of section 6 of the Code for Crown Prosecutors, in particular the factors in paragraph 6.1, when selecting the appropriate charges.
The following checklist may assist in setting out potential sources of evidence where unlawful immigration is facilitated by vehicles:
The following checklist may assist, additionally, in setting out potential sources of evidence where unlawful immigration is facilitated by boat:
Section 32(2) of the Immigration Act 1971 provides for documents made or given by the Secretary of State or signed by him or on his behalf, to be received in evidence. Thus, correspondence from the Home Office to immigrants may be admissible in its own right.
The admissibility of other records, documents etc. are subject to the law of evidence, in particular sections 117 and 118 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003. This includes other Home Office records not falling within the scope of section 32.
Difficulties can arise when evidence is required as to the status of an illegal entrant who has already been deported. This evidence is a vital ingredient of the offence in respect of a person charged with assisting unlawful immigration.
Evidence is usually adduced of a list of legal entrants from which the particular illegal entrant’s name will be missing. The court is then asked to draw the simple inference that absence from the list equates with illegality. The list must be introduced by a Home Office official responsible for the compilation of the list, as the list is not automatically admissible: the negative inference is not an exception to the hearsay rule: R v Patel [1981] 3 All ER 94. The HO official should give evidence as to how the list was compiled and confirm its accuracy: DPP v Leigh [2010] EWHC 345 (Admin).
R (HM) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] EWHC 2729 (Admin) confirmed the Immigration Enforcement blanket policy of seizure and retention of mobile phones from all migrants on small boats without consideration of the legal basis was unlawful. Section 15 (Schedule 2) of the Illegal Migration Act 2023, which came into force on 20 July 2023, confers new powers for Immigration Enforcement to search and seize Electronic Devices from persons liable to be detained.
CPIA Codes of Practice paragraph 3.2 requires the investigator to pursue all reasonable lines of inquiry, whether these point towards or away from the suspect. What is reasonable in each case will depend on the circumstances. The Attorney General’s Guidelines on Disclosure 2022 provide guidance on reasonable lines of inquiry. The Full Code Test should be applied when all outstanding reasonable lines of inquiry have been pursued,; or before, if the prosecutor is satisfied that any further evidence or material is unlikely to affect the application of the Full Code Test, whether in favour of or against a prosecution.
The Threshold Test can be applied before all reasonable lines of inquiry have been completed, but only when all five conditions outlined in paragraph 5 of the Code have been met. When cases are submitted for a charging decision under the Threshold Test prosecutors must consider what further evidence can be obtained, within a reasonable period of time, to provide a realistic prospect of conviction. This evidence needs to be identifiable and not merely speculative.
This is particularly important to consider in cases involving piloting of small boats when facilitation charges are being considered. Prosecutors should discuss with investigators what further evidence will be obtained and they should consider the checklist of points given listed above in the respect of boat’s evidential checklist. If a suspect has advanced an account of their role in piloting a boat, the prosecutor should consider what lines of inquiry should be pursued to rebut or support the account. For example, whether it is a reasonable line of inquiry to obtain accounts from passengers on the boat.
Prosecutors must have regard to the impact of any failure to pursue an advised reasonable line of inquiry when deciding whether the Full Code Test can be met. If there is insufficient evidence to prove a facilitation charge it may be necessary for a prosecutor to go on to consider an illegal arrival/ entry or attempted illegal arrival/ entry offence. For these offences the reasonable lines of inquiry are likely to be different as the issue in the case will be distinct.
Review is a continuing process and prosecutors must take account of any change in circumstances that occurs as the case develops. This includes what becomes known of the defence case, any further reasonable lines of inquiry that should be pursued, and receipt of any unused material that may undermine the prosecution case or assist the defence case, to the extent that charges should be altered or discontinued, or the prosecution should not proceed.
When reviewing immigration offences, prosecutors should consider whether there is clear evidence of a credible common law defence of duress or duress of circumstances.
Prosecutors should bear in mind that illegal immigration is often inextricably linked to human trafficking and organised crime. It is for the defence to raise sufficient evidence of duress and/or duress of circumstances to allow it to be considered by the jury. The legal burden then falls upon the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant was not acting under duress.
The UK has positive obligations under Article 4 of the European Convention on Human Rights to take operational measures to protect victims, or potential victims, of trafficking. This includes a duty to investigate, penalise and prosecute traffickers. See VCL and AN v United Kingdom (Applications 77587/12 and 74603/12) [5 July 2021].
When applicable, prosecutors should consider the following statutory defences:
Section 31 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 (IAA) provides a statutory defence for refugees committing particular offences, providing they satisfy stated conditions.
The applicable offences under section 31(3) are:
The conditions that must be satisfied for the defence to apply are set out at section 31(1) and (2).
“Refugee”, defined in Article 1 of the Refugee Convention 1951, is a person who has left their own country owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.
Under section 31(5) a refugee is not entitled to this defence in relation to any offence committed after making a claim for asylum. Consequently, a defendant who enters the country either clandestinely or legally, claims asylum, and then obtains false documents for use in attempting to travel to another country, would be outside the scope of section 31.
Where asylum seekers arrive or enter through the use of false documents (whether by boat, commercial airline or some other means), particular consideration will need to be given to which offences are charged. They will be prima facie guilty of both a section 24 offence and a false document offence. However, section 31 will only afford a defence to the false document offence.
The defence only applies to refugees, but consistent with its statutory purpose it may be advanced at trial by those who are at that time presumptive refugees (those ultimately accorded refugee status and also those claiming asylum in good faith). In these cases, it is for the jury to determine whether the defence is made out and the issue for the jury is whether the defendant is a refugee. It is common ground that the burden would be on the prosecution to disprove the defendant’s refugee status [Mateta at 21 i) and ii)] and the jury should be directed along these lines: "Has the prosecution made you sure that the defendant is not a refugee? If you conclude that he is or might be a refugee, you must return a verdict of not guilty." The defence does not extend beyond refugees to presumptive refugees (under 339C of the Immigration Rules); see Elmi [2022] EWCA Crim 1428 at [37] and [49].
Section 37(4) of NABA provides that a refugee cannot claim Article 31 protection when in transit leaving the UK.
Section 37(1) of NABA provides that a refugee is not to be taken to have come to the United Kingdom directly from a country where their life or freedom was threatened, if they stopped in another country outside the United Kingdom, unless they can show that they could not reasonably be expected to have sought protection under the Refugee Convention in that country. Relevant factors to assess when considering if a defence under section 31 is made out, having regard to section 37 include the following:
In the case of R v Asfaw [2008] UKHL 31 the House of Lords observed that it is permissible to charge a defendant both with an offence to which the section 31 defence applies and with an offence to which it does not. However, if the second charge is based on the same conduct and is included in an indictment in order to prevent the defendant from relying on the section 31 defence, there would be strong grounds for arguing that this is an abuse of process.
In SXH v The CPS [2017] UKSC 30, the Supreme Court considered whether a suspect’s entry into the UK as an asylum seeker and the decision to prosecute her for entering with false travel documentation (an offence which could attract the section 31 statutory defence) engaged Article 8 of the ECHR. The Court held that the decision to prosecute did not amount to a breach of Article 8, observing that: “it is difficult to envisage circumstances in which the initiation of a prosecution against a person reasonably suspected of committing a criminal offence could itself be a breach of that person’s human rights”.
The court in R v Mateta [2013] EWCA Crim 1372 provided a useful summary of the main elements of the defence, including the burden and standard of proof, as set out in R v Makuwa [2006] EWCA Crim 175, although should be read in the light of NABA:
The burden on the defendant as far as their refugee status is concerned is merely an evidential one i.e. they must adduce sufficient evidence to raise the issue.(See Makuwa [21, 38] for the elements that must be addressed and how the jury should be directed on them: a well-founded fear of persecution; fear based on one of the Convention reasons.) The prosecution must then prove beyond reasonable doubt that they were not a refugee. But in cases where the Secretary of State has refused an asylum application, the legal burden rests on the defendant to establish on a balance of probabilities that they are a refugee (see also section 31(7) IAA).
In respect of the matters in sections 31(a), (b) and (c) and section 31(2), the defendant has a legal burden i.e. must prove on a balance of probabilities that:
The CPS is reliant upon the Immigration Authorities for information relevant to an assessment of whether a defence under section 31 may apply. SXH v CPS [2013] EWHC 71 (QB) confirmed that it is “rational and proportionate that the CPS should depend upon the relevant agencies and departments to keep them informed” [85].
In all cases in which a section 31 defence may apply, the information relevant to an assessment should be provided as early as possible prior to charge and should include:
If a suspect is a refugee and the Home Office determines that the other conditions in the section 31(1) and (2) criteria are met, no charges should be brought.
Where CFI submit a case for charging advice on the basis that the section 31(1) and (2) conditions have not been met, prosecutors must carefully consider the evidence submitted. Pursuant to paragraph 4.6 of the Code for Crown Prosecutors, prosecutors must be satisfied that there is sufficient evidence to provide a realistic prospect of conviction against each suspect on each charge. They must consider what the defence case may be, and how it is likely to affect the prospects of conviction. A case which does not pass the evidential stage must not proceed, no matter how serious or sensitive it may be.
If the suspect is not a refugee, the defence is not available, regardless of whether they fulfil the other conditions. It will be a matter for IE to consider deportation/removal and/or refer the case to the CPS for a charging decision.
In accordance with paragraph 3.6 of the Code, prosecutors have a duty of continuing review and must take account of any change in circumstances, such as any further information that comes to light regarding the suspect’s refugee status and asylum claim.
Where a suspect's refugee status is yet to be determined or is the subject of an appeal to the Immigration Appellate Authority, it would normally be appropriate to await the outcome of the asylum proceedings before making a decision on charge, if consideration is being given to charging one of the section 31(3) listed offences. This will usually be the case where CFI indicates that a decision will be made about a suspect’s refugee status within a reasonable amount of time.
However, in some cases refugee status can take several years to determine, and it is advisable that liaison takes place with the case officer and the Home Office to ascertain when a decision will be reached, as this may impact on the decision to charge.
An undetermined asylum application is not a barrier to prosecution and prosecutors should consider all the circumstances of the case in deciding whether to await the outcome of the asylum application or to proceed to charge. Prosecutors should have sight of the suspect’s screening interview and Immigration Enforcement reports.
The following factors, for example, may be relevant:
In cases where the prosecution accepts that the suspect satisfies all the other conditions in sections 31(1) and (2), and the only issue is the suspect’s refugee status, no offences listed in section 31(3) should be charged until the status is determined. No Further Action should be taken in these cases, but the suspect should be given a re-instatement warning, in the event that refugee status is not granted.
In the event that a suspect is charged prior to determination of their refugee status, at the earliest possible court hearing, and prior to trial, the officer in the case should be asked to provide a written update on the defendant's refugee status.
If the defendant claims to be a refugee and no determination has been made, the Crown's position should be that while not accepting the claim or making any concessions in respect of their refugee status, the Crown will not seek to establish that they are not a refugee for the purpose of the criminal trial. In such cases there will be no issue for the jury to decide and no need to explain the term: R v Makuwa [2006] EWCA Crim 175 [37].
The issue at trial, in terms of the statutory defence, will be insufficient evidence of compliance with one or more of the other conditions in sections 31(1) and (2). For example, the defendant may or may not be a refugee, but the prosecution can prove they did not come directly from the country of persecution, or there was an unreasonable delay before they presented himself to the UK authorities. The defence and the court should be provided with a copy of R v Makuwa, to ensure that all parties are aware of what facts give rise to a section 31 defence, the burden and standard of proof and how the jury should be directed.
There have been a number of appeals based on an accused’s representative’s failure to advise them about the availability of the section 31 defence: see Leveson LJ’s comments in R v Mateta [24] and R v AM and Others [2010] EWCA Crim 2400 [10, 56] on the obligations of defence representatives.
Prosecutors should therefore carefully consider whether accounts given by asylum seekers could give rise to a defence, so as to minimise the risk of successful appeals based on the appellant’s failure to properly put forward a section 31 defence at trial. If a defence is likely to be raised, the CFI officer in the case should be requested to obtain evidence on the refugee status and asylum claim: see the sections above on determining a refugee’s status.
Section 2 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants etc.) Act 2004 creates two offences of not having an immigration document at a leave or asylum interview, relating to the person and any dependent children: see the Tables of Immigration Offences in Annex 1 below.
Sections 2(4) and 2(5) of the Act contain the main statutory defences to these two offences.
The Act does not define ‘reasonable excuse’ but section 2(7) excludes deliberate destruction or disposal from amounting to a reasonable excuse for non-possession at interview, unless it was beyond the control of the entrant or for a reasonable cause. Reasonable cause does not include delaying the handling or resolution of a claim or application, increasing its chances of success, or complying with the instructions or advice of a facilitator (agent), unless it is unreasonable to expect non-compliance with the instructions or advice.
The CPS is reliant upon Immigration Enforcement for information relevant to an assessment of whether a section 2 defence might apply. In cases where a suspect makes an assertion that an agent told him to destroy or hand over their passport, this should be scrutinised by investigators.
R v Navabi and Embaye [2005] EWCA Crim 2865 confirms that the burden of proving the defence is on the defendant and it is a legal burden i.e. on the balance of probabilities [29-30].
In Thet v DPP [2006] EWHC 2701 (Admin) the court clarified that the document referred to in subsections (3) and (6) is a genuine document. Therefore, if the person enters the UK on a false passport but fails to produce it at interview, it is a reasonable excuse for not providing a document under section 2(6)(b) that it was impossible for them to obtain a genuine passport in their country of origin.
In R v Mohammed and Osman [2007] EWCA Crim 2332 the court held that the defence applies if:
The person is unable to obtain a genuine travel document because of the political situation or lack of issuing facilities in the country of origin.
The genuine travel document is stolen or destroyed en route, or in the UK, through no fault of the applicant.
The court in R v Navabi confirmed that although the offence created by section 2 falls within the ambit of Article 31 of the Refugee Convention, neither Article 31 nor section 31 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 can provide a defence to a section 2 charge, as Parliament had not fully incorporated Article 31 into domestic law.
In refugee cases where the section 2 defences do not apply, prosecutors should apply the approach to charging decisions set out in the section on the Public Interest below. This will ensure that the purposive and humanitarian aims of the Refugee Convention are borne in mind when considering the public interest.
Section 45 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015 provides a defence for victims of slavery or trafficking who are compelled to commit criminal offences.
The defence applies to all offences in the Tables of Immigration Offences in Annex 1 below, including the new offences, save for the offences under section 25 of the Immigration Act 1971 (Assisting unlawful Immigration) and section 32 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 (endangering safety of railway passengers).
NABA introduced a new exclusion and two defences into the 1971 Act at sections 25BA and 25BB.
The exclusion means that a person or organisation does not commit an offence of facilitation if the act is done by, on behalf of, or co-ordinated by Her Majesty’s Coastguard or an overseas equivalent. This provides protection not only for organisations such as the Royal National Lifeboat Institution (RNLI), but individual seafarers who respond to mayday relays.
These defences to the offences of facilitating illegal entry or the entry of asylum-seekers apply in circumstances where: (1) a person rescues another person at sea, or (2) a ship’s master carries a stowaway into the UK or a person on board a ship assists a stowaway for humanitarian reasons.
Where an offence is wholly or partly committed at sea, prosecutors should consider the question of jurisdiction.
Under the Territorial Waters Jurisdiction Act 1878 (‘the 1878 Act’), UK territorial waters extend 12 miles out to sea; Territorial Sea (Baselines) Order 2014 (SI 2014 No. 1353); Territorial Sea Act 1987.
At common law, the courts of England and Wales have jurisdiction to try a crime where a substantial measure of the activities constituting the crime take place within the jurisdiction, save where it can seriously be argued on a reasonable view that the offences should be dealt with by another country: Smith (No. 4) [2004] EWCA Crim 631. Thus, there is jurisdiction to prosecute offences committed outside England and Wales where nonetheless the final element or a substantial measure of the activities were within the territory. The substantive offence contrary to section 24, for instance, is completed upon arrival or entry in England or Wales and therefore there is jurisdiction to try the offence even if other elements of the offence were committed outside England or Wales. There may also be jurisdiction to try an attempt to commit a section 24 offence even where the conduct was outside the jurisdiction. This is because the substantial measure of the activities lies in the fact the offence was intended to be committed in England and Wales. This may arise where interdiction has taken place outside of UK territorial waters. For example, where boats are interdicted within the search and rescue zone, which is in international waters, rather than waiting for the boat to enter UK territorial waters.
The Merchant Shipping Act 1995 provides jurisdiction in respect of offences committed on ships. However, that legislation covers offences committed at sea either by UK nationals on ‘foreign’ registered ships or committed by ‘foreign’ nationals on UK ships (which would include offences committed e.g. on UKBF or RNLI boats). This would be unlikely to apply in immigration cases involving non-British nationals using boats.
The 1878 Act grants jurisdiction of the Admiralty over all offences “punishable on indictment” committed in UK territorial waters. This is the case whether or not the suspect is a British subject or where the ship is registered. “Punishable on indictment” relates to any indictable offence: either-way and indictable-only offences.
Section 46 of the Senior Courts Act 1981 confers jurisdiction for criminal proceedings on indictment from the Admiralty to the Crown Court. For either-way offences dealt with summarily, section 2 of the Magistrates’ Court Act 1980 gives jurisdiction to the magistrates’ courts in respect of all either-way offences. Thus, either-way offences committed in UK territorial waters can be dealt with either in the magistrates’ or Crown court in the usual way, subject to consent for prosecution being obtained as set out below.
Accordingly, prosecutors should be aware that there does not appear to be a statutory basis for any court in England and Wales to have jurisdiction over summary offences committed by non-UK nationals on board non-UK vessels in UK territorial waters.
A conspiracy may involve the commission of an act by one or more of the parties, or the happening of an event, in a place outside England and Wales. This situation is covered by section 1A of the Criminal Law Act 1977 which provides that where (a) that act or event would be an offence by the law of that place and (b) it would also be an offence here (but for the fact that it takes place outside the jurisdiction), then a person in England and Wales who becomes a party to the agreement or, being a party, does anything in pursuance of the agreement (even before its formation) can be charged with conspiracy contrary to section 1(1) of the Criminal Law Act 1977. Note, however, prior consent of the Attorney General is required to prosecute offences to which section 1A applies.
For further guidance on obtaining the consent of the Law Officers see prosecution guidance on Consents to Prosecute.
Prosecutors should be aware of the procedural requirements for consent to prosecute in respect of some Admiralty offences. Section 3 of the 1878 Act requires that prosecutors obtain consent from a Secretary of State before a prosecution can be instituted for an offence within the jurisdiction of the Admiralty where the defendant is not a UK citizen. This applies to indictable-only or either-way offences committed in UK territorial waters, including under the Criminal Attempts Act 1981 and the Offences Against the Person Act 1861. However, there is no requirement to obtain consent for any offences within Part III of the Immigration Act 1971; see section 28(2A) of the 1971 Act. This previously only applied to section 25 or 25A facilitation offences, but on 24 August 2022 section 28(2A) of the Immigration Act 1971 was amended to include all offences within Part III, which includes illegal entry or arrival offences and attempts.
Prosecutors should follow the process set out in the legal guidance on Consents to Prosecute, including the guidance on the timing of consent. An application using the template in Annex 3 of that guidance should be prepared, setting out why the CPS conclude the Full Code Test is met. In completing Annex 3, the prosecutor should also address: the nationality of the defendant; and whether anything has been identified in the course of the investigation that would suggest there may be concerns on the part of any foreign government were this defendant to be prosecuted for the offence alleged. The application should be authorised by a CCP or DCCP. It should be sent to the Directorate of Legal Services, where possible putting them on notice in advance about the fact that an application is to be submitted and the timescale in which a decision is required. The Secretary of State should be asked to provide a signed certificate to the following effect:
I HEREBY CONSENT to the prosecution of (name) of (DOB/address) for an offence or offences contrary to the Immigration Act 1971, committed within the territorial waters of the United Kingdom, and certify that the institution of such proceedings is in my opinion expedient.
The Immigration (Offshore Worker Notification and Exemption from Control (Amendment)) Regulations 2023 came into effect on 12 April 2023. Regulations brings section 43 (working in UK waters: arrival and entry) of the NABA 2022, and Schedule 6 to that Act which clarifies the legal framework around the requirement that individuals working in UK waters need permission to do so. This applies for those in the fishing industry who may be working on boats in the territorial waters adjacent to the UK.
When assessing whether a prosecution is required in the public interest, prosecutors must follow the approach set out in section 4 of the Code for Crown Prosecutors, in particular the factors listed in paragraph 4.14.
The following additional public interest factors may be relevant when making the decision to prosecute:
When assessing whether the public interest test is met, prosecutors should adopt the following approaches depending on the nature of the case.
The defence under section 31 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 reflects the UK’s obligations under Article 31 of the Refugee Convention. This defence only applies to specific offences. Section 37(1) of NABA also sets out Parliament’s intention that there should be no immunity from penalty where protection could reasonably have been sought in a different country during the defendant’s journey.
In cases where there is no statutory defence, prosecutors should have regard to circumstances which are relevant to Article 31 of the Refugee Convention when considering the public interest stage. Pursuant to paragraph 2.10 of the Code for Crown Prosecutors, prosecutors must have regard to the obligations arising from international conventions.
Specifically, prosecutors should consider the factors listed below in relation to Article 31. This will ensure that the humanitarian aims of the Convention are appropriately taken into account when deciding whether or not to prosecute. For more information on determining the approach to be taken when determining whether a suspect is a refugee, see the section above.
The burden and standard of proof to be applied in considering these factors should be the same as would apply to a section 31 defence at trial: see the section on Statutory Defences above.
The presence of all of these factors will make it less likely that a prosecution is required. However, unlike statutory defences, they will not provide an automatic bar to prosecution.
In all cases where the suspect is a refugee and the public interest test is applied, prosecutors must outline their approach to Article 31, including the reasons for their decision on the public interest, in their case review.
For a structured approach to assessing the merits of a section 31 defence, see para 9(4) of R v Dastjerdi [2011] EWCA Crim 365 (applied in R v PK [2017] EWCA Crim 486 and R v Idahosa [2019] EWCA Crim 1953).
The Article 31 factors will need to be weighed with any other factors identified in the case, to form an overall assessment of the public interest. The factors listed below under “Administrative removal” will be relevant. Additionally, the following factors should be considered:
The following public interest factors would be considered relevant when making the decision to prosecute:
In relation to the section 24 illegal arrival and entry offences, it may be that those refugees, or presumptive refugees, who commit criminal offences as a necessary part of their journey to the UK are not prosecuted, provided the conditions in section 31(1) (as interpreted in Asfaw) are met.
Where a claim for asylum has been made, factors in support of prosecution may be:
Examples may include asylum seekers with a particular organisational role, such as the facilitation of the buying of the boat in Bani and others [2021] EWCA Crim 1958, or the different seriousness in conduct in a case like Mirahessari and Vahdani [2016] EWCA Crim 1733.
Article 31 does not necessarily apply to these offences in the same way as to the section 24 offence, as the Refugee Convention provides protection for refugees themselves, rather than those who assist them (whatever their motives may be).
However, if an asylum claim has been made by someone charged with a facilitation offence, prosecutors should consider their culpability in the facilitation offence.
In those circumstances, their actions may be closer to being “necessarily committed in the course of flight from persecution”, and therefore covered by Article 31.
The principles underpinning the Refugee Convention to which the UK is a signatory are relevant to the assessment of the public interest.
For those without a claim for protection, the Refugee Convention should have no bearing on the decision to charge or prosecute.
In some cases, it may not be in the public interest to prosecute suspects who have endured persecution but who are technically not refugees, because their persecution does not amount to a Convention reason.
Prosecutors should first consider whether the public interest can be properly served by offering the offender the opportunity to have the matter dealt with by an alternative to prosecution. This applies to any case involving a non-refugee who is in the UK illegally, whether they are accused of an immigration or other type of offence. The alternatives available are:
When considering these alternatives, prosecutors will have regard to the fact that there is a substantial cost to the public when a foreign national offender, who needs to be managed in the community or kept in immigration detention, remains in the UK. See paragraph 4.14(f) of the Code: prosecutions should be a proportionate response.
The person in question must agree to administrative removal. However, persons who are suspected of committing a section 2 offence (not having a travel document at a leave or asylum interview) or an offence which may attract a defence under section 31 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999, are likely to be seeking leave to remain or asylum. Accordingly, it is not likely that they would agree to administrative removal. It will be for the Home Office to determine whether administrative removal – rather than a prosecution – is the most appropriate action. Additionally, if a person is a genuine refugee, they should not be administratively removed.
The factors relevant when deciding whether administrative removal is in the public interest are as above under The Public Interest: General Approach. An additional factor is a likely sentence of less than 12 months’ imprisonment.
If administrative removal is not considered appropriate, in cases (including indictable only cases) where the likely sentence would be less than two years’ imprisonment, consideration should be given to offering the suspect a conditional caution with foreign offender conditions.
For more detailed information, refer to the section on FNOCCs below.
If neither administrative removal nor a FNOCC is considered appropriate, prosecutors should apply the Code, including consideration of the questions at paragraph 4.12. In most cases, it is likely that a prosecution will be in the public interest.
If it comes to the notice of the prosecutor that the suspect may have committed an immigration offence whilst in a coerced situation and may be a victim of human trafficking or slavery, the investigating officer should be asked to make further enquiries and refer the suspect through the National Referral Mechanism.
When making a decision on whether it is in public interest to prosecute such suspects, prosecutors should follow the approach in the prosecution guidance on Modern Slavery and human trafficking: offences and defences, including the section 45 defence.
The purpose of the Foreign National Offender Conditional Caution (FNOCC) is to bring about the offender’s departure from the UK and to ensure that return does not occur for a specified period of time. These conditions must be imposed in every case.
The offender may also be required to:
If the FNO does not comply with the conditions set, they can be prosecuted for the original offence.
A FNOCC may only be offered to a foreign offender having no leave to enter or remain in the UK, and in respect of whom there is power to enforce departure.
FNOCCs may be used in cases that would ordinarily result in the imposition of imprisonment following conviction, where the sentence likely to be imposed for the offence under consideration would be less than two years imprisonment. They should only be used where it will be practicable to remove the person within a reasonable period of time.
FNOCCs cannot be offered where the offender makes, or has, an outstanding asylum or human rights claim to remain in the UK, or where the offender admits to committing a document or identify fraud offence in order to make a claim for asylum, or where the offender may be a trafficked victim. This does not prevent a FNOCC being offered where the asylum or human rights claim has been withdrawn or refused and any appeal against refusal has been finally determined.
A FNOCC can still be issued following charge if, following a review, the prosecutor considers the case might be disposed of more appropriately in this way. If so, prosecutors should engage with the defence before the first court hearing, to determine whether they agree. Once the FNOCC is administered, the case would be discontinued.
See also the section on the Public Interest above.
For facilitation offences, the leading case is R v Le and Stark [1999] 1 Cr App R (S) 422, which related to the original section 25 offence in force, which had a maximum penalty of 7 years’ imprisonment at the time of the decision, but remains good authority:
In Attorney General's References (Nos 49 and 50 of 2015) (R v Howard; R v Bakht) [2015] EWCA Crim 1402 the court listed the following non-exhaustive factors as relevant to a case of conspiracy to contravene section 25:
The above guidance applies equally to those facilitating others in boats as well as vehicles. However, offences of facilitation by boat are also aggravated by the high risk to life inherent in this method of entry, caused by the actions of those organising the crossings and piloting the vessels. Different levels of responsibility and personal mitigation for the crossings will generally go to the issue of sentence rather than the decision to prosecute.
Procedures in relation to deportation are dealt with under the prosecution guidance on Sentencing - Ancillary Orders. Prosecutors should be fully familiar with these procedures, including their role in identifying and drawing the court’s attention to defendants eligible for deportation.
Section 25C of the Immigration Act 1971 provides a power for the forfeiture of vehicles, ships or aircraft used in the commission of the offences under sections 25 and 25A of the Immigration Act 1971.
For other offences, the power to forfeit items used in the commission of a crime under sections 152-155 of the Sentencing Act 2020 (which applies to all convictions on or after 1 December 2020) should be considered.
If an offender used their vehicle to facilitate immigration crimes, an application may be made for an order to disqualify them from holding or obtaining a driving licence under sections 162-170 of the Sentencing Act 2020.
n exception to the hearsay rule: R v Patel [1981] 3 All ER 94). The HO official should give evidence as to how the list was compiled and confirm its accuracy: DPP v Leigh [2010] EWHC 345 (Admin).
The following table sets out the most commonly prosecuted immigration offences For Statutory Defences: see the Immigration legal guidance.
The s4 offence is more serious than the s6 offence, requiring an improper intention (using the document for identity fraud). In many cases it will be possible to infer the intent from all the circumstances of the case.
In R v Goodings [2012] EWCA Crim 2586 the court emphasised the importance of the prosecution selecting the correct charge to reflect the true gravity of the conduct and not accepting a guilty plea to the lesser s6 offence, which does not properly reflect the evidence. The court also indicated that if a plea is taken to the lesser offence, it would be improper for the prosecution to put the case on the basis that the defendant had the intention (of impersonating another person), and he cannot be sentenced on that basis.
See below the case of R v Heng Pit under the offence Obtaining leave by deception.
Apparatus is defined in s9 of the Act.
See below the case of R v Heng Pit under the offence Obtaining leave by deception.
Sections 1-5 contain a number of offences relating to making, copying and use of specified false documents.
Passports and similar identity documents do not apply, as these are now covered by offences under the IDA 2010.
For further guidance on these offences, and on offences of forgery of specific items, see the legal guidance on Forgery and Counterfeiting.
See below the case of R v Heng Pit under the offence Obtaining leave by deception.
This section creates a number of offences relating to the creation, possession and use of false or altered registration cards. These cards are issued by the Secretary of State in connection with a claim for asylum or support for former asylum seekers, temporarily unable to leave the UK.
Most cases will not be suitable for summary trial unless there are exceptional circumstances.
Subject | Comment |
---|---|
Category | Either way |
Maximum Sentence | 2 years' custody |
Statutory Defence | S45 MSA |
Key points | Cases where any element of organisation or financial gain is involved are likely to be suitable for trial on indictment. |
S2 creates two offences of not having an immigration document (usually a passport) at a leave or asylum interview, relating to the person and any dependant children.
Bei Bei Wang [2005] EWCA Crim 293 reiterates Home Office guidance:
Charging: there is no requirement to await the outcome of an asylum application before making a charging decision:
Mode of trial: Factors to consider are:
In normal circumstances, a custodial sentence is inevitable - not least because
these offences have the real potential to undermine the whole system of immigration control: R v Bei Bei Wang [2005] EWCA Crim 293.
12 months’ custody or a fine (on summary conviction)
5 years’ imprisonment or a fine (on indictment)
The person must knowingly enter the UK in breach of a deportation order.
Evidence is required from the Home Office confirming the deportation order.
Evidence is also required from the first responder and interview of the suspect as to how they have breached the order.
12 months’ custody or a fine (on summary conviction)
4 years’ imprisonment or a fine (on indictment)
A person who requires leave, must knowingly enter the UK without the leave of an immigration officer.
It is for the defence to prove that the person had leave to enter the UK.
12 months’ custody or a fine (on summary conviction)
4 years’ imprisonment or a fine (on indictment)
A person who lawfully entered the UK with leave must either knowingly overstay their limited leave to remain beyond the time allowed; and/or fail to observe a conditions of the leave.
This requires proof of limited leave, the expiry date and knowledge of remaining beyond that date.
The evidence should include a statement from the Immigration Officer who admitted the defendant, setting out: the explanation to the defendant of the limits of leave and the fact that a notice in writing under s4 was given (usually a passport stamp).
If the Secretary of State extends leave, a letter will normally be sent to the person stating the new limit. This provides the requisite notice in writing and its admissibility is governed by s32(2) of the Act.
This is a continuing offence and can be charged as being committed on the day when the defendant first knew that the time limited by the leave had expired or, alternatively, as an offence continuing over a specified period. An offender may only be prosecuted once in respect of the same limited leave: s24(1A).For evidence of failing to observe a condition of leave, evidence is required of the notice in writing, the specific condition that is imposed, the breach of the condition and the defendant’s knowledge.
12 months’ custody or a fine (on summary conviction)
4 years’ imprisonment or a fine (on indictment)
A person who requires entry clearance, knowingly arrives in the UK without a valid entry clearance.
Evidence will include that there was no entry clearance issued by the Secretary of State.
It is for the defence to prove that the person had valid entry clearance.
Persons requiring entry clearance are those who require a visa to enter the UK or a certificate of entry.
12 months’ custody or a fine (on summary conviction)
4 years’ imprisonment or a fine (on indictment)
A person who requires a valid ETA for their journey to the UK and knowingly arrives without one commits the offence.
Evidence will include the fact that there was no ETA issued by the Secretary of State. An ETA will be required before arrival for all persons, except British and Irish citizens, who do not currently need a visa for short stays, or who do not already have an immigration status prior to travelling.
This provision will commence on a date after the new Immigration Rules come into force.
The following conditions can be imposed on a limited leave to remain:
Evidence is required of the notice in writing, the specific condition that is imposed, the breach of the condition and the defendant’s knowledge.
An automatic extension of leave also extends the conditions. However, if the leave expires, then the conditions lapse. Accordingly, there would be no offence of failing to observe a condition of leave but an offence of overstaying under s24(1)(b)(i) may be charged.
Note that those who are working in breach a restriction on employment would ordinarily be charged with the offence of “Illegal working” under section 24B of the 1971 Act: see the section on Employment offences.
If the person is on immigration bail and, without reasonable excuse, breaches a bail condition. This also includes a breach of electronic tagging.
Prosecutors will need to consider whether there is a reasonable excuse that the defendant breached bail sufficient to amount to a defence.
This is a “last resort” offence and only to be used in most aggravating circumstances where there is an extremely serious breach.
Evidence will be needed from the Home Office of bail conditions and how conditions were breached.
Prosecutors should consider whether there is a potential charge of criminal damage if an electronic tag has been destroyed or severely.
NABA has made it an offence to obtain an Electronic Travel Authorisation (ETA) by deception. See s24(E1) above for more information on ETAs.
Documentary offences will usually be prosecuted under the Identity Documents Act 2010 (IDA), which has a higher maximum sentence of 10 years’ imprisonment: see above.
Mode of trial: under the Allocation Guideline, many cases will be suitable for summary trial, but some may be subsequently committed for sentence, as offences involving breaches of immigration control are considered to be serious and merit deterrent sentences: see AG Ref Nos 1 and 6 2008 [2008] EWCA Crim 677, which cites the sentencing case of R v Kolawole - see below.
This offence is broad in scope and can be applied to a number of situations, such as:
Prosecutors must consider the facts carefully to determine which subsection applies, and draft the charge / indictment accordingly: see R v Boateng [2016] EWCA Crim 57 [12-15].
To prove deception, direct evidence from the immigration official who was deceived should ordinarily be obtained. Deception includes the silent presentation of a false passport.
There may also be an offence under s26(1)(c) of the 1971 Act of making a false statement, return or representation to an immigration official in the commission of any offence under s24 of the 1971 Act. See below for s26 offences.
R v Heng Pit Ding [2010] EWCA Crim 1979 summarised a number of sentencing principles by reference to previous cases, including R v Ovieriakhi [2009] EWCA Crim 452 and R v Kolawole [2005] 2 Cr. App. R (S) 14:
It confirmed that the principles set out in R v Ali [2001] EWCA Crim 2874 still apply: passport cases provide useful guidance on sentence - it is a prevalent type of offence that has potential to undermine the system of immigration control, and will be treated very seriously; good character and personal mitigation are of very limited value and cases of this kind should be sentenced on a deterrent basis.
Offences under the Identity Cards Act 2006 (since replaced by offences under the Identity Documents Act 2010), are not more serious than the offences under s24A(1) of the 1971 Act (committed by use of a false document), which have a maximum of 2 years’ imprisonment. (The sentencing range of the 2006 Act offences - 10 years - had to cater for the worst possible case, such as the manufacture and distribution of false documents on a commercial basis, for significant gain.)
The sentence guidance in R v Kolawole, in relation to offences under the Forgery and Counterfeiting Act 1981, applies to the Identity Cards Act offences and to the 1971 Act offences: where a false passport is held or used for the purpose of defeating immigration control, the appropriate sentence on a guilty plea by a person of good character is in the range of 12-18 months.
The sentence could be less in cases where the passport is used not to defeat or avoid border control, but to obtain work or open a bank account, particularly if the offender is of good character and doing no more than seeking employment.
There is no distinction for sentencing purposes between offences committed under subsections 24A(1)(a) and 24A(1)(b).
S31 IAA applies to the offence under s26(1)(d), altering documents or possessing false documents.
The 3 years’ extended time limit for prosecutions provided for by section 28 applies to offences under subsections 26(1)(c) and (d).
The offence may be committed in a number of ways, by frustrating the work of immigration officers who conduct an examination on entry. For example:
The legislation does not define “a reasonable excuse”. This will be a question of fact in the particular circumstances of each case. Evidence to contradict any claims of reasonable excuse should be obtained where possible.
The most common way the offence is committed is under section 26(1)(c), making a false statement etc. A charge under this subsection may be appropriate where, for instance, the suspect denies their real identity when asked, or a form is filled in with deliberately false information. For offences under this subsection:
The “other person” may include a police officer but not when the officer is investigating a suspected offence under the Act. The relevant falsehood has to be addressed to a person in the course of a specific procedure under the Act, whereby that person’s statutory function involved the obtaining or receipt of information relevant to the performance of that function: see R v Clarke [1985]
A.C. 1037.
The offence of Obstructing an immigration officer or other person acting in execution of the Act requires physical or other unlawful activity: R v Clarke. If the obstruction relates to a refusal to do something, there must be a duty under the Act to do what is requested by the immigration official, such as permitting
The offence is intended to prevent people who, having exhausted all avenues of appeal following a failed asylum claim, avoid deportation by refusing to comply with arrangements for removal, such as signing the necessary documentation attending an interview or providing biometric information: see subsection (2).
Home Office guidance indicates that once a defendant raises an excuse, it is for the prosecution to disprove it or show that it is not reasonable to the criminal standard. The guidance gives examples of reasonable excuse: medical emergencies or transport problems.
In R v Masoud Tabnak [2007] EWCA Crim 380 the court found that a failure to co- operate based on a fear of persecution or serious harm could not amount to a reasonable excuse. This issue is one which will have already been determined by the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal, a specialist tribunal which is best placed to consider whether the defendant’s claim for asylum is genuine or not.
Subject | Comment |
---|---|
Category | Summary |
Maximum Sentence | 6 months' custody |
Statutory Defence | S45 MSA |
Key points | Under s23 an immigration officer may arrest a person without warrant if the officer reasonably suspects that the person has committed or is about to commit an offence under s22. |
Persons may try to enter the UK by walking through the Channel Tunnel from France to England. When this happens, the tunnel operators may shut down the power supply and suspend rail traffic, potentially causing disruption, delay and financial loss.
In these circumstances, it may be appropriate to charge an offence under s36 of the Malicious Damage Act 1861.
In R v Mirahessari and Vahdani [2016] EWCA Crim 1733 the court made a number of observations in relation to the s36 offence:
The court also rejected a submission that the applicants were denied the opportunity to rely on the defence for refugees under section 31 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 by the preferring of a charge to which the defence did not apply: the conduct of the applicants, in entering the tunnel and causing considerable disruption and delay and significant financial loss, could not be said to be reasonable and necessary in the course of seeking refuge from
persecution.
Subject | Comment |
---|---|
Category | Indictable only |
Maximum Sentence | Life in custody |
Statutory Defence | S45 MSA |
Key points | no information in this cell |
Subject | Comment |
---|---|
Category | Indictable only |
Maximum Sentence | Life in custody |
Statutory Defence | None |
Key points | No information in this cell |
Subject | Comment |
---|---|
Category | Either way |
Maximum Sentence | 2 years' in custody |
Statutory Defence | S45 MSA |
Key points | No information in this cell |
Less serious offences under the Channel Tunnel Byelaws 1994 may apply, including:
The offence may be committed by, for example:
The offence covers any act facilitating a breach of immigration law by a non-British/Irish citizen (including a breach of another Member State's immigration law).
The offence covers any actions done whether inside or outside the United Kingdom, regardless of the nationality of the perpetrator.
S25(2) defines “immigration law” as a law which has effect in any member State (not just the UK) and which controls, in respect of some or all persons who are not nationals of that State, entitlement to enter, transit or be in the State.
S25(2)(a) extends the offence to those who facilitate the entry or arrival of a non-British/Irish national to the UK or non-EU citizen to a European Union member State in breach of immigration laws.
For the meaning of “enter” in s25(2) see s11 of the Act and also R v Javaherifard and Miller [2005] EWCA Crim 3231, [12 & 46].
The defendant is entitled to know which particular law they are being accused of breaching. Prosecutors should therefore identify in the particulars of offence the immigration law said to have been breached. The law that is breached need not constitute a criminal offence (see below). It must be an immigration law within s25(2) of the Immigration Act 1971 (“the 1971 Act”). Therefore, subsections 1(2) and / or 3(1)(b) of the Act 1971 Act may be relied on separately or in combination, depending on the facts of the case, to specify the breach: as taken together these laws ‘determine’ (see R v Kapoor and others [2012] 2 Cr. App. R. 11) whether a person is lawfully in the UK: see R v Dhall [2013] EWCA Crim 1610 [20]. Where ss1 and / or 3 are relied on as the underlying immigration law, it is not necessary to prove that the person who is the subject (beneficiary) of the breach of immigration law (e.g. the person whose illegal entry was facilitated) himself/herself had the requisite mens rea to be guilty of an immigration offence: see R v Boateng [2016] EWCA Crim 57. In cases where a person (P) obtains leave to enter by deception (whether the deception is by P or a third party), P will be an illegal entrant (s33(1) defines “illegal entrant” as including a person “entering or seeking to enter by means which include deception by another person”). Since P’s entry was illegal, it can be argued that P did not enter the UK in accordance with s3 (although P entered with leave, that leave was illegally obtained). P being in the UK having entered will also be inconsistent with s1 (P will not have a right of abode). Therefore, the breach of immigration law is by virtue of ss1 and 3. In such “deceptive leave” cases, a separate note should be served with the indictment, to explain that there was a breach of ss1 and 3 by virtue of the fact that leave was only gained by deception (see also R v Adams [1996] Crim.L.R. 593 and R v Eyck [2000] 1 WLR 1389).
If the facts of the case suggest that the breach of immigration law should not be particularised by reliance on ss1 and / or 3, care must be taken to ensure that the immigration law relied on is an immigration law under the 1971 Act, which determines whether a person is lawfully or unlawfully either entering the UK, or in transit or being in the UK: see R v Kapoor.
For a non-exhaustive list of evidential requirements, see the main legal guidance.
Prosecutors should consider application of the new defences and exclusions under s25BA and 25BB, including for stowaways.
Prosecutors should also consider potential claims of asylum or humanitarian protection (e.g. modern slavery).
If the evidential test is met, it is likely to be in the public interest to prosecute. See the main legal guidance for a list of relevant public interest factors.
R v Javaherifard and Miller [2005] EWCA Crim 3231 provides detailed guidance on what is likely and not likely to constitute facilitation of another person’s unlawful stay in the UK.
R v Ali [2015] EWCA Crim 43 held that it is not necessary to prove that an actual breach of immigration law occurred [45], so an offence can be facilitated whether or not it is committed.
In R v Naillie [1993] AC 674, HL, decided under the precursor offence, it was held that:
However, R v Adams [1996] Crim LR 593 and R v Eyck [2000] 1 WLR 1389 clarify that the position is different from that in Naillie where the would-be entrant intends to and receives help to evade immigration controls altogether before arriving in the UK.
Sternaj & Sternaj v DPP [2011] EWHC 1094 (Admin): the statutory defence in s31 Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 did not apply where the appellants were registered asylum seekers who facilitated the entry of a young child (the son of one of the appellants) using another child’s passport [33]. However, the prosecution might question whether it was in the public interest to prosecute [32].
The leading case is R v Le and Stark [1999] 1 Cr. App. R. (S.) 422, which related to the original section 25 offence, which had a maximum penalty of 7 years’ imprisonment at the time of the decision:
For examples of how R v Le has been applied in more recent cases, see: R v Shahi [2010] EWCA Crim 2480; R v Chocat [2010] EWCA Crim 1468; and R v Kvec [2008] EWCA Crim 594.
In AG’s References (Nos 49 & 50 of 2015) (R v Howard; R v Bakht) [2015] EWCA Crim 1402 the court listed the following non-exhaustive factors as relevant to a case of Conspiracy to contravene s25, referring to the case of AG’s Reference (No 28 of 2014) [2014] EWCA Crim 1723:
In R v Bani [2020] EWCA Crim 233, the Court of Appeal provided a useful summary of sentencing authorities, including the cases of R v Roman [2017] EWCA Crim 6 and R v Rotsias [2013] EWCA 2470, where following guilty pleas, 2-3 years’ imprisonment was found to be appropriate in facilitation cases where appellants were escorting illegal migrants into the country and receiving payment. At the time of these decisions, the maximum penalty was 14 years’ imprisonment.
A sham marriage is a marriage of convenience entered into with the intention of gaining immigration rights for one of the spouses. Whilst referred to as a sham marriage, the union itself is valid if it conforms to the legal requirements for marriage. However, entering into a sham marriage does not entitle migrants to a right to remain in the UK. Following the “marriage” the parties must apply for the right to remain.
Sham marriages typically occur when a foreign national marries a British or Irish citizen, or someone in the UK with pre-settled status under the EU Settlement Scheme, as a means of attempting to gain long-term residency and the right to work and claim benefits. An individual sham marriage is often part of a wider organised crime network which may arrange multiple sham marriages and carry out other criminal activity, including money laundering and identity fraud.
A range of offences might be disclosed in cases of sham marriage, dependant on the number and identity of the participants and the role they play. For example, those who arrange the ceremony and the participants at the wedding, including witnesses and the vicar conducting the ceremony, may be charged with assisting unlawful immigration (facilitation) and conspiracy to facilitate breach of immigration law.
R v Oliveira; R v Cina; R v Oramulu [2012] EWCA Crim 2279 is the leading sentencing case on sham marriages. The court indicated that the aggravating factors set out in R v Le and Stark (see above) apply to sham marriage cases, to which the following factors should be added:
This is a "lifestyle offence" under Sch. 2 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002.
The offence is aimed at those who bring asylum seekers to the UK to enable them to claim asylum. It does not apply to persons acting on behalf of an organisation which aims to assist asylum-seekers, and does not charge for its services.
No element of smuggling is required to make out the offence; the asylum seekers do not need to be illegal entrants.
The offence covers any actions done whether inside or outside the UK, regardless of the nationality of the perpetrator.
This offence no longer requires evidence of financial gain as this was removed by the NABA. Prosecutors should consider application of the new defences and exclusions under s25BA and s25BB, including for stowaways.
Prosecutors should consider potential claims of asylum or humanitarian protection (s45 MSA).
All cases that were charged before the commencement of s25A (as amended by the NABA) will still need proof of evidence of direct financial gain. Where there are difficulties in obtaining evidence of direct (financial) gain to support an offence under s25A, prosecutors should consider whether there might be sufficient evidence to infer gain. For instance, the defendant’s expenditure or lifestyle may be inconsistent with his apparent earnings or receipt of benefit. In this regard, expenditure on travel and hotels as part of the offending may be relevant. If no gain can be inferred from the evidence, a charge under s25 may be appropriate.
If the evidential test is met, it is likely to be in the public interest to prosecute. See the main legal guidance for a list of relevant public interest factors.
The factors listed above in the leading sentencing cases in respect of s25 would appear to apply also to the s25A offence: see R v Le and Stark [1999] 1 Cr. App. R. (S.) 422 and AG’s References (Nos 49 & 50 of 2015) (R v Bakht) [2015] EWCA Crim 1402.
This provision was omitted following the UK’s exit from the EU. Transitional provisions can be found in the relevant regulations.
These are "lifestyle offences" under Sch. 2 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002.
The offences cover any actions done inside or outside the UK.
The offence under subsection (3) can apply in cases where the Secretary of State has made an order to exclude an individual from the UK on the grounds of public policy, public security or public health (other than a temporary exclusion order under s2 of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015).
The Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006 (IANA) contains a civil penalty regime for employers under s15 IANA 2006, in addition to the offence under s21.
An employer of illegal immigrants can face three potential sanctions, depending on the how serious the employer’s actions are considered:
Penalties of up to £20,000 per illegal worker may be imposed under s15 IANA.
This is the starting point for consideration and according to the Home Office should be used for all routine non-compliance with the law.
In some cases a civil penalty procedure is considered inadequate and the Civil Penalties Department may refer cases to the CPS for possible criminal proceedings.
This is likely to occur when it is apparent that the employer has deliberately and knowingly breached the law, shown a pattern of exploitative behaviour or evaded payment of penalties by closing and re-opening businesses in another identity.
For an offence under s21 to be committed, the employee must be disqualified from employment by reason of the employee's immigration status. S21(1B) defines disqualified persons.
The mens rea of “reasonable cause to believe”, inserted by s35 Immigration Act 2016, is intended to capture employers who deliberately fail to check if a worker has the right to work in the UK.
All case reviews should include consideration of the reasons for the authorities not adopting the penalty notice procedure. If the papers submitted by the police / immigration authorities contain no clear decision-making process, this should be questioned. Recorded reasons will make cases less susceptible to abuse of process arguments or judicial review.
An offence of Assisting unlawful immigration to a member state or to the UK (see section above on Facilitation offences) can be considered in serious cases, such as organised criminal activity to evade immigration rules.
The offence covers persons who work in breach of conditions attached to their permission to be in the UK, under s24 of the 1971 Act.
The normal course of action will be to remove illegal workers in preference to prosecution. Only where the illegal worker has refused to cooperate or has a serious record of abusing immigration laws and committed other offences, will Immigration Enforcement consider referral for prosecution.
The earnings of the illegal worker can also be seized under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. Following conviction, the prosecutor must consider whether to ask the court to commit the person to the Crown Court for confiscation proceedings.
The Code for Crown Prosecutors is a public document, issued by the Director of Public Prosecutions that sets out the general principles Crown Prosecutors should follow when they make decisions on cases.
This guidance assists our prosecutors when they are making decisions about cases. It is regularly updated to reflect changes in law and practice.